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EXPANDING THE ARSENAL FOR SENTENCING
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES: WOULD THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE WORK?
CARRIE C. BOYD*
Whether occurring under the cover of darkness by a typical
criminal, or behind the protective barrier of corporate
structures by a business school graduate, [environmental
crimes] are some of the most far-reaching, dangerous and
complex crimes affecting society. They are crimes that may
directly affect our health today or the health of untold
generations to come.1
INTRODUCTION
Both civil and administrative penalties serve appropriate and
important roles in dealing with violations of environmental laws. However,
the disaster at Love Canal in 19782 demonstrated that civil and admin-
istrative remedies were failing to deter environmental crime, and thus
all three branches of the federal government, as well as state and local
authorities, began to consider criminal liability as an important tool for
dealing with environmental criminals.3 Given that the "environmental
crisis" can be said to "[cause] substantially more illness, injury, and
* William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2008. Special thanks to my parents for their
enduring support, to Professor Wayne Logan for helping me select this topic, and to the
Editorial Board of the William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review.
'Judson W. Starr, Countering Environmental Crimes, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 379,
394 (1986).2 YINGYI SITu & DAVID EMMONS, ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM'S
ROLE IN PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT 8 (2000); see also Eckardt C. Beck, The Love Canal
Tragedy, EPA J., Jan. 1979, http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/lovecanal/01.htm (describing
the history of the Love Canal project, its transition from a planned community to a toxic
waste dump, and the human casualties resulting from the reckless toxic waste disposal
at the site).
3 SITU & EMMONS, supra note 2, at 11.
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death than street crime,"4 the introduction of criminal sanctions into the
arsenal of possibilities for environmental crime sentencing makes sense.
Over the years, criminal liability has increased the deterrent and
retributive effects of environmental crime sanctions.5 However, prose-
cutions for environmental violations committed by both individuals and
corporations continue. Perhaps, therefore, other alternatives besides civil,
administrative and criminal penalties should be considered in dealing with
these specialized types of crimes. As this Note will suggest, therapeutic
jurisprudence-specifically, problem-solving courts-and restorative justice
practices may offer unique and unconsidered strategies for sentencing
environmental crimes.
Part I will consider the history of environmental crime in the United
States and abroad, and the differences between the civil and criminal
sanctions currently used to respond to environmental violations. Part II
will explain the requirements and penalties within some important United
States environmental statutes, and will outline the specifics of the United
States Sentencing Guidelines for environmental statute violators, in-
cluding corporations. Part III will highlight the distinctions between how
courts respond to "environmental criminals" who may cause indiscrimi-
nate injuries and more "traditional criminals" whose crimes cause more
easily identifiable injury. Part IV will address the problems of proof asso-
ciated with identifying environmental crime victims and transition to
Part V, which will introduce two additional sentencing approaches: the
therapeutic problem solving court model that centers on rehabilitating
the defendant and the restorative justice model that focuses on restoring
the victim. Part V will advocate that using these two models, along with
the more punitive approaches within the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
and environmental statutes, can add to the sentencing possibilities for
those who commit environmental violations. This discussion will include
consideration of the possible weaknesses in this overall argument, address-
ing in particular the issue of double jeopardy raised within the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.
4 Id. at7.
5 MARY CLIFFORD, ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME: ENFORCEMENT, POLICY, AND SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY 5 (1998) (explaining that environmental crime "typically refers to crimes
involving hazardous wastes, irresponsible corporate activities, water contamination, or
other violations of environmental law").
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I. ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME
A. History: The Rise of Environmental Regulation
1. In the United States
After the 1970s, the United States government began to take
environmental protection more seriously in response to public sentiment
and growing scientific evidence of the threats caused by pollution.' During
this period, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") was created7
and Congress drafted environmental statutes such as the Clean Air Act
Amendments' and the Clean Water Act.9 These statutes, among others,
"seek to establish a balance between industrialization and the equally
important goal of protecting the public health and welfare while pre-
serving natural resources."10 In 1981, the EPA established an Office of
Criminal Enforcement" which "enforces the criminal provisions of...
[the] statutes in conjunction with the Department of Justice ("DOJ")."' 2
In addition, the DOJ created an Environmental Enforcement Section
within its Lands Division to provide litigation support to agencies and deter
statute violations. 3 During the 1970s, the courts only prosecuted twenty-
five environmental crimes.'4 By contrast, "[in fiscal year 2000, the EPA
referred 236 criminal cases to DOJ, and the courts assessed $122 million
in criminal penalties." 5 The increase over eighteen years can be attributed
6Id. at 10.
7Id.
8 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7661 (2000)).
'Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as amended at 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (2000)).
10 Starr, supra note 1, at 379.
" Mark A. Cohen, Environmental Crime and Punishment: Legal/Economic Theory and
Empirical Evidence on Enforcement of Federal Environmental Statutes, 82 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1054, 1056 (1992).
Elizabeth M. Jalley et al., Environmental Crimes, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 403,406 (2002).
'
3 Judson W. Starr, Turbulent Times at Justice and EPA: The Origins of Environmental
Prosecutions and the Work that Remains, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 900, 904 (1991) ("The
Environmental Enforcement Section was formed, primarily to enforce civil environmental
law sanctions. One publicly stated goal of the reorganization was to enhance criminal
prosecution....").
4 F. Henry Habicht II, The Federal Perspective on Environmental Criminal Enforcement:
How to Remain on the Civil Side, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,478, 10,479 (1987).
"5 Jalley et al., supra note 12, at 406.
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in part to the EPA's hiring of criminal investigators "with the authority
to carry firearms and execute search and arrest warrants." 6
In 1992, the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") became in-
volved in environmental enforcement through a memorandum of under-
standing with the EPA.' 7 After that time, investigation of those who
violated environmental laws took place in a similar manner to investiga-
tion of other criminals." In addition to imposing monetary fines, courts
also began sending environmental statute violators to prison.' 9 In 1997,
the courts ordered "195.9 years worth ofjail time" to those found guilty
of violating environmental laws.2 °
In each environmental statute, penalties not only target individual
persons but corporations as well.2' The statutes all include corporations
in their definition of "persons" 22 and liability is based on the "imputation
of agents' [or employees'] conduct to a corporation, usually through the
application of the doctrine of respondeat superior."23 Respondeat superior
is a common law principle under which an employer can be held liable
for tortious actions of his employees committed within the scope of their
employment, even though the employer may not be personally at fault.24
When considering the sentence severity for corporate environ-
mental violations, however, EPA and DOJ apply a flexible standard. Both
16 SITu & EMMONS, supra note 2, at 13 (stating that by 1995, at least two hundred inves-
tigators were employed by the EPA).
17 Id.
's See generally id.
19 Id. at 14.
" Nancy K. Kubasek et al., The Role of Criminal Enforcement in Attaining Environmental
Compliance in the United States and Abroad, 7 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 122, 123-24 (2000).
" See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e) (2000) (implying that an organization can be a defendant
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA")); id. § 6928(f)(5) (defining
the term 'organization" as "a legal entity, other than a government, established or
organized for any purpose," which includes "a corporation, company, association, [or]
firm") (emphasis added).
22 See id. § 6903(15) (defining the term "person" within the RCRA statute to mean "an
individual, trust, firm, joint stock company, corporation (including a government corpo-
ration), partnership, [or] association "(emphasis added)).
3 V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability, What Purpose Does it Serve?, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 1477, 1489 (1996).
' Carol M. Lynch, Rule lOb-5-The Equivalent Scope of Liability Under Respondeat
Superior and Section 20(a)-Imposing a Benefit Requirement on Apparent Authority, 35
VAND. L. REV. 1383 (1982) (discussing the breadth of respondeat superior with the
breadth of certain provisions of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934).
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agencies "look favorably upon.., voluntary compliance efforts." 2' These
include, for example, "voluntary disclosure," taking proactive "preventive
measures," and "self-policing."26 The EPA implemented a policy in 2000
that made penalty reductions contingent on self-auditing and included
incentives for voluntary discovery and compliance.
2. Around the World
Within the United States alone, tension between the health of the
environment and economic and corporate development complicates envi-
ronmental protection efforts and creates the necessity for numerous laws
and sanctions promulgated by Congress, regulated by state and federal
agencies, and enforced by the judiciary.
The complexity of the problems within the United States helps to
explain the lack of success in dealing with environmental criminality on an
international scale. One of the central issues that complicates the control
of environmental misconduct worldwide is that the effects of environmental
crimes are often indeterminate and therefore difficult to prove.28 Further-
more, the "jurisdictional boundaries of most environmental laws.., tend
to turn on questions of degree that are, at best, gray at the border."29
After the 1970s, around the time the United States began paying
more attention to environmental concerns, other nations also began to
consider the threats to environmental quality.3 ° At the United Nations'
World Congress on the Human Environment, held in Stockholm in 1972,
the countries in attendance acknowledged the importance of the envi-
ronment to the protection of public health.3' "The Stockholm Declaration
25 Jalley et al., supra note 12, at 418.
26 Id. at 407.
27 See Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of
Violations, 65 Fed. Reg. 19,618, 19,619 (Apr. 11, 2000) (stating that "[t]o provide an
incentive for entities to disclose and correct violations . . .the Policy reduces gravity-
based penalties by 75% for violations that are voluntarily discovered and promptly dis-
closed and corrected").
2 Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of Environ-
mental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L.J. 2407,2421-22 (1995).29 Id. at 2431.
'0 Terry L. Anderson & J. Bishop Grewell, It Isn't Easy Being Green: Environmental
Policy Implications for Foreign Policy, International Law, and Sovereignty, 2 CHI. J. INT'L
L. 427,427 (2001) ("Before 1970, only thirty-seven environmental treaties were in force.
After 1970, an additional 104 were created.").
1See Gerhard O.W. Mueller, An Essay on Environmental Criminality, in ENVIRONMENTAL
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states that'[m] an has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and ade-
quate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life
of dignity and well-being.'"3 2 Twenty years later, the Rio Declaration echoed
the sentiment that man is "entitled to a healthy and productive life in
harmony with nature," but also recognized the "inherent tension between
the right to development and the right to a healthy environment."33
Despite the fact that multiple nations agreed with the message
of these two declarations, and regardless of the common knowledge that
man-made pollution does not simply stop at state or national borders, "few
conventional laws and domestic laws criminalize international environ-
mental misconduct effectively." 4 In fact, environmental criminal laws that
are legally binding on all nations do not exist and there is no organization
with the authority to create such legislation.35
B. Current Sanctions: Civil v. Criminal
Within the United States system, the purposes of criminal and
civil law are different, so legislatures and courts use varying rules and
paradigms to analyze their actions and decisions in regards to those
differences.36 The Constitution, statutory law, and the common law each
distinguish between criminal sanctions, which emphasize guilt and
innocence, and civil proceedings, which "emphasize the rights and respon-
sibilities of private parties."37 Criminal enforcement is best understood
CRIME AND CRIMINALITY: THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL ISSUES 4 (Sally M. Edwards et al.
eds., 1996).
"Peter Sharp, Prospects for Environmental Liability in the International Criminal Court,
18 VA. ENvTL. L.J. 217, 229 (1999) (citing United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment adopted by the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in
Stockholm, June 16, 1972); Conference on the Human Environment, June 5-16, 1972,
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 2-3, U.N.
Doc A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (June 16, 1972).
" Sharp, supra note 32, at 229 (citing Adoption of Agreement on Environment and
Development: The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, at 3, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 876 (1992)).
3' Byung-Sun Cho, Emergence of an International Environmental Criminal Law?, 19
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 11, 11 (2000-2001).
35 Id. at 37 (stating that "there is no international superlegislature to establish inter-
national environmental criminal laws and no effective international mechanism with
enforcement authority").
36 Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and
Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1796-97(1992).37Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law
[Vol. 32:483488
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as "one tool in an enforcement toolbox that also includes various civil
and administrative enforcement options."" The courts utilize different
procedural and investigatory rules, standards and "burdens of proof, rules
of discovery," and methods of punishment within criminal and civil pro-
ceedings.39 In light of these alternatives to federal liability, the question
can be raised why Congress found the addition of criminal sanctions for
environmental crimes necessary.
One reason might be that criminal penalties lead not only to
incapacitation, possessing a significant deterrent value, but they also
possess a "unique ability to express moral condemnation."41 Corporate
officials in particular, and in some instances individuals, "belong to a social
group that is exquisitely sensitive to status deprivation and censure" and
will respond to the moral stigma that accompanies a criminal prosecu-
tion.41 In contrast, simply using regulatory justice and focusing on a social
harm needing a remedy sustains the idea that there is little wrong with
specific individuals within a corporation, or members of the public, who
may intentionally or negligently violate a law.
1. Civil Sanctions
Civil law is defined as "a compensatory scheme, focusing on damage
rather than on blameworthiness, and providing less severe sanctions and
lower procedural safeguards than the criminal law."4 3 In principal, the
purpose of civil sanctions is to compensate for damages caused, while
criminal sanctions are aimed at retribution and incapacitation." "Absent
adequate civil sanctions" for environmental criminals who cause injury
to human and environmental health, "polluters have [little to] no incen-
Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Distinction, 42 HASTINGS
L.J. 1325, 1325 (1991).
38 Michael M. O'Hear, Sentencing the Green-Collar Offender: Punishment, Culpability,
and Environmental Crime, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 133, 144 (2004) [hereinafter
O'Hear, Sentencing the Green-Collar Offender].
a Cheh, supra note 37, at 1325.
40 Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of Criminal
Liability, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1295, 1295 (2001).
41 GILBERT GEIS, ON WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 53 (1982).
42 Brown, supra note 40, at 1339.
43 Mann, supra note 36, at 1799.
4See generally Jerome Hall, Interrelations of Criminal Law and Torts: 1, 43 COLUM. L.
REV. 753, 767 (1943).
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tive to modify their environmentally harmful conduct."45 This illustrates
a need for increased criminal enforcement to bolster the civil sanctions.
Also, "lenient [civil] sanctions encourage [the] perception that environ-
mental transgressions are not considered serious by either society or the
criminal justice system."46 Therefore, more severe penalties are necessary
to prove to environmental criminals that their actions are not condoned
by society.
2. Criminal Sanctions
Criminal enforcement of environmental crime increased throughout
the 1980s. "In 1987 United States Attorney General Edwin Meese autho-
rized a new Environmental Crimes Section within the.. . Department
of Justice."4 7 "Criminal law is [in general] distinguished by its punitive
purposes, its high procedural barriers to conviction, its concern with the
blameworthiness of the defendant, and its particularly harsh sanctions.4 8
Others have proposed that, in reality, all that distinguishes a criminal
from a civil sanction is the level of "community condemnation" that
justifies the sanction.49 In some situations, it has been argued that only
imprisonment will allow the "full weight of the criminal law to be brought
to bear on that conduct."" Regardless, without criminal sanctions, corpo-
rations in particular may view the penalties for environmental violations
as a mere "cost of doing business" that they may ultimately pass on to
their customers.51
All the environmental statutes that exist in the United States
contain provisions, restrictions, and requirements that expose violators
" Steven L. Humphreys, An Enemy of the People: Prosecuting the Corporate Polluter as
a Common Law Criminal, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 311,327 (1990).46 Kasturi Bagchi, Application of the Rule of Lenity: The Specter of the Midnight Dumper
Returns, 8TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 265,266-67 (1994) (quoting Brian E. Concannon, Jr., Comment,
Criminal Sanctions for Environmental Crimes and the Knowledge Requirement: United
States v. Hayes International, 786 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1986), 25 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 535,
538 (1988)).
" Susan Hedman, Expressive Functions of Criminal Sanctions in Environmental Law,
59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 889, 894 (1991).
4' Mann, supra note 36, at 1799.49 DAVID C. BRODY ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 8 (2001).
" Edmund W. Kitch, Economic Crime Theory, 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE
670-678 (1983), reprinted in CORPORATE AND WHITE COLLAR CRIME: AN ANTHOLOGY 18
(Leonard Orland ed., 1995).
"1 Richard J. Lazarus, Assimilating Environmental Protection into Legal Rules and the
Problem with Environmental Crime, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 867,880 (1994).
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to criminal, civil, and administrative liability.52 Civil judicial enforcement
implies the possibility of significant monetary punishment that, for various
environmental crimes, may reach "up to $25,000 per day."" Allowing for
larger fines and more jail time, criminal enforcement can be "seen as a
harsher substitute for civil enforcement." 4 As demonstrated below, the
"civil, criminal and administrative penalt[ies]" in environmental statutes
overlap and many of the same types of penalties appear within multiple
statutes.
II. THE ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES AND THE SENTENCING
GUIDELINES
A. Overview of Major Environmental Statutes
For a first example, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
("RCRA") is designed to control hazardous waste from "cradle-to-grave" 6
by regulating its generation, treatment, storage, transportation, and
disposal. According to the Act, solid waste is hazardous if it is ignitible,
corrosive, reactive, or toxic." Under section 6928 of the Act, seven specific
criminal actions have been identified.59 Six of these impose a penalty of
up to $50,000 per day of violation and up to five years of imprisonment.6"
52 See generally Charles J. Babbitt et al., Discretion and the Criminalization of
Environmental Crimes, 15 DUKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 1 (2004) (arguing"that while broad
prosecutorial discretion is justified on economic efficiency grounds, extending criminal
sanctions to outcomes lacking violator intent or control is likely to result in the over-
criminalization of environmental law").
" Jeremy Firestone, Enforcement of Pollution Laws and Regulations:An Analysis of Forum
Choice, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 105, 109 (2003). See also 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (2000).
Michael Herz, Structures ofEnvironmental Criminal Enforcement, 7 FORDHAM ENVTL.
L. REV. 679, 680 (1996).
55Jeffry S. Wade, Environmental Damages and Crimes, 15 FLA. J. INT'L L. 39, 42 (2002).
56John C. Chambers & Mary S. McCullough, From the Cradle to the Grave: An Historical
Perspective of RCRA, 10 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T. 21,22 (1995) (stating that the "cradle-
to-grave... regulatory program, commonly referred to as the RCRA Subtitle C program,
is widely viewed as the most comprehensive regulatory program ever developed by EPA").
5 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6992 (West 2002 & West Supp. 2005).
' See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(7) (2000) (incorporating the definitions of hazardous waste
under various other environmental statutes).
9 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (2000).
'o These six actions include: (1) transporting waste to a non-permitted facility; (2) treating,
storing, or disposing of waste without a permit or in violation of a permit condition;
(3) omitting a significant information form, or making a false statement; (4) failing to
2008]
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If any action regarding hazardous waste places a person in imminent
danger of death or serious bodily injury, an individual may be fined
$250,000 and/or receive up to fifteen years imprisonment. If such a crime
is committed by a corporation, that entity may be fined up to $1,000,000.61
In addition, RCRA gives authority to the DOJ to file civil judicial actions
in United States District Court against persons or companies who have
not complied with the statutory requirements of RCRA.6 2 The EPA can
also issue administrative orders pursuant to sections 3008(a), 7003, 3013,
and 9006 of the Act.63
As a second example, the 1990 Clean Air Act ("CAA") amendments
allow the EPA Administrator to impose civil penalties of up to $25,000 per
day for violation of any requirement, rule or order.64 As with most envi-
ronmental statutes, citizens can seek civil penalties through citizen suits.65
In addition, after 1990, criminal fines of up to $250,000 and prison sen-
tences up to five years can now be imposed on any person who knowingly
or negligently releases any hazardous air pollutants listed on the Superfund
list.66 As is most often the case, those fines are higher for corporations.
6 7
As aforementioned, most of the other environmental statutes con-
tain the same or similar criminal, civil or administrative penalties as those
in RCRA and the CAA. One such example is the Toxic Substances Control
Act ("TSCA"), which aims to eliminate the "unreasonable risk of injury
to health or the environment" from introducing toxic substances into the
market.6 Under TSCA, manufacturers must maintain records and
submit reports on their chemical manufacturing, importing, and process-
ing; they violate the law if they do not do so. 69 Specific enforcement such
comply with RCRA's record keeping and reporting requirements; (5) transporting waste
without a manifest (containing information about the generator of the waste, the recip-
ient of the waste, and the quality and quantity of the waste), and; (6) exporting waste
without consent of the receiving country. Id.
61 Id.
62 Environmental Protection Agency, RCRA Enforcement Process and Authorities, http:l!
www.epa.gov/compliance/civil/rcra/rcraenfprocess.html; see also 42 U.S.C. § 6928(g) (2000)
(outlining civil monetary penalties under RCRA).
' Supra note 62.
64 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(1) (2000).
65 See, e.g., id. § 7604; 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000).
66 U.S. Department of Energy, Clean Air Act, http://www.hss.energy.gov/nuclearsafety
nseaa/oepa/policy/caa (last visited Jan. 10, 2008).67 id.
' Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)).69 Id. § 2(b)(2), 90 Stat. at 2004.
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as an injunction under TSCA section 17 or criminal sanctions under TSCA
section 16 (requiring knowing or willful conduct) may be warranted."
The Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974 ("SDWA") represented the
first federal attempt to control harmful contaminants in public water and
to regulate drinking water underground. 71 The Act requires tap water pro-
viders to meet national drinking water standards 72 and implements under-
ground injection control programs to protect the quality of groundwater.73
Under the Act, the states have the primary enforcement responsibilities
for implementing the regulations and their programs must meet or ex-
ceed minimum federal requirements. 74 Enforcement of the SDWA includes
civil fines of up to $25,000 per day of violation and criminal fines.75
In addition, violations of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA") result in similar types of civil, administrative,
and criminal penalties. FIFRA regulates pesticides that threaten the envi-
ronment.7' The Act requires distributors of pesticides to register with the
government. 77 All new pesticides must be registered with the EPA, includ-
ing the complete formula, a proposed label, and a description of the tests
administered.7" Those who fail to adhere to FIFRA's mandates are subject
to civil penalties of up to $5,000 per offense, if they are an employee or
professional, or $1,000 if they are an individual or private citizen. 79 Crim-
inal sanctions can include up to $50,000 in fines and one year in prison for
professionals on the job and up to $1,000 in fines and thirty days in jail for
private citizens."0
70 Memorandum from Jesse Baskerville, Director, Toxics and Pesticides Enforcement
Division, to Regional Division Directors for TSCA § 8, 12 & 13 and Regional Enforcement
Directors for TSCA § 8, 12 & 13 (Mar. 13, 1999), available at http://www.epa.epa.gov/
compliance/resources/policies/civil/tsca/erp8_ 2r.pdf.
" Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-26 (2000)).
72 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-g (2000).
73 Id. §300h(b).
74 Id. § 300g-2.
75 Id. § 300h-2(b).
71 See generally 7 U.S.C.A §§ 136-136y (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 110-180).
17 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a).
'8 7 U.S.C.A § 136a(c) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 110-180); see also EPA Region
5 Information Sources, http://www.epa.gov/lawsregs/laws/fifra.html (last visited Jan. 10,
2008) (indicating that "[t]hrough later amendments to the law, users must also take
exams for certification as applicators of pesticides").
7' 7 U.S.C. § 1361(a) (2000).
80 Id. § 136l(b).
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Finally, there is the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), which seeks to
eliminate discharges of pollutants into navigable waters, with an interim
goal to achieve water that is both 'fishable' and 'swimmable.'8 ' Before dis-
charging pollutants, polluters must obtain a National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System ("NPDES") permit that contains limits on how much
of a pollutant can be discharged from identifiable point sources.8 2 The per-
mit holder must monitor and report his discharge and must use the "best
available technology" (as determined by the EPA) to treat the pollution
before releasing it.13 Similar to the other statutes, civil and administra-
tive penalties along with criminal fines and prison sentences accompany
violations of the CWA.
8 4
All of these statutes make clear that individuals and corporations
are not wasting their time by considering compliance with environmental
laws to be an important goal. Difficulties arise when those individuals and
corporations do not have knowledge of the requirements, feel that ignor-
ing the requirements would be easier or better for their business, or are
unclear about the environmental impacts of their actions.
In 1984, through the Sentencing Reform Act, Congress directed
the U.S. Sentencing Commission to "serv[e] as a clearinghouse and infor-
mation center for the collection, preparation, and dissemination of...
Federal sentencing practices. " " The commission promulgated the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, which remain the most comprehensive sentencing
system in existence."6 These guidelines have proved helpful in clarifying
some of the confusion inherent in the environmental statutes with which
corporations and individuals must comply.
B. Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Environmental Crimes
The U.S. Sentencing Commission included in the Federal Guidelines
specific provisions for environmental violations."V The guidelines require
" 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 (2000).
82 See id.§ 1342(A).
" Id. § 1317(a)(2) (stating that "[elach toxic pollutant listed in accordance with paragraph
(1) of this subsection shall be subject to effluent limitations resulting from the applica-
tion of the best available technology economically achievable for the applicable category
or class of point sources").
84See id. 33 U.S.C. § 1319.
85 28 U.S.C. § 995(a)(12)(A) (2000). See also Charles Loeffler, An Overview of the U.S.
Sentencing Commission Data, 16 FED. SENT'G REP. 14, 14 (2003).
" Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural
Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1319 (2005).87 GREGOR I. MCGREGOR, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ENFORCEMENT 124 (1994).
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judges to impose specific sentences for various categories of environmental
violations and assist in providing uniformity when sentencing the same
crimes.' The sentencing subsections dedicated to environmental violations
are not assigned to a specific statute, but instead overlap and appear in
more than one Act, as discussed in the previous section. 9
In 1991, the Sentencing Commission promulgated the Organiza-
tional Sentencing Guidelines.9 ° Under these guidelines, organizations can
be sanctioned with fines, community service, placing public notices or
apologies in local newspapers, and probation terms.91 The guidelines are
designed to further just punishment and deterrence, two primary goals of
sentencing.92 The guidelines give organizations an incentive to implement
effective compliance programs93 and are marked by an "avowedly prag-
matic 'carrot and stick' approach."94 This creates an appropriate "mix of
persuasion and punishment."95
In December 1993, an advisory group to the Sentencing Commission
published proposed guidelines for corporations convicted of federal envi-
ronmental crimes.96 These guidelines focused on environmental compli-
ance programs that reduced corporate exposure to criminal liability.97 The
88 See 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 2Q1.1 to 2Q2.1 (2000).
9 See Cindy Johnson, For Better or Worse: Alternatives to Jail Time for Environmental
Crimes, 26 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 265,267 (2000) (outlining the six
subcategories that cover numerous criminal environmental violations).
9 0 PAULA DESIO, DEPUTY GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE
ORGANIZATIONAL GUIDELINES, http://www.ussc.gov/corp/ORGOVERVIEW.pdf (last visited
Jan. 10, 2008).
91 Id.; see also Growing the Carrot: Encouraging Effective Corporate Compliance, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1783, 1786 (1996) (stating that the guidelines require an organization of fifty
or more employees be placed on probation until it implements an effective compliance
program).
92 Mark A. Cohen, Environmental Sentencing Guidelines or Environmental Management
Guidelines: You Can't Have Your Cake and Eat it Too!, 8 FED. SENT'G REP. 225,225 (1996)
(stating that"Congress mandated that its guidelines consider the need forjust punishment,
specific and general deterrence "); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2000).
93See Win Swenson, The Organization Guidelines' "Carrot and Stick"Philosophy, and Their
Focus on "Effective Compliance", in CORPORATE CRIME IN AMERICA: STRENGTHENING THE
"GOOD CITIZEN" CORPORATION 27, 34-35 (1995).94 Wayne A. Logan, Criminal Law Sanctuaries, 38 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 321,358 (2003).
95 FIONA HAINES, CORPORATE REGULATION: BEYOND "PUNISH OR PERSUADE" 9 (1997).
96 Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 58 Fed. Reg. 65,764 (Dec. 16, 1993)
(requesting public comment).
" See generally Jason M. Lemkin, Deterring Environmental Crime Through Flexible
Sentencing: A Proposal for the New Organizational Environmental Sentencing Guidelines,
84 CAL. L. REV. 307 (1996) (arguing for "wider penalty ranges and.., greater opportunity
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landmark corporate compliance case, In re Caremark International Inc.,
demonstrates that organizational guidelines generally provide "powerful
incentives" for corporations to create "compliance programs to detect viola-
tions of law, promptly to report violations" to the proper authorities, and "to
take prompt, voluntary remedial" measures.9" In addition, "[tihe Caremark
decision expanded potential liability for board members by holding that a
corporate director has a good faith duty to see that adequate information
and reporting systems are established within the organization."99
United States v. Mills was "[tihe first environmental case to success-
fully impose jail sentences and fines using the Sentencing Guidelines.°°
This case "involved six counts of knowingly dredging a canal and dis-
charging fill into wetlands in violation of the Clean Water Act." 10' The
defendants, two Florida landowners, were convicted on six counts and
sentenced to twenty-one months injail without the possibility of parole.0 2
In addition, a supervised release required that they "comply with a site
restoration plan prepared by the [Army] Corps [of Engineers]" and the
EPA, and a fine of over $5,000.103
III. THE APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS: ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINALS
VS. TRADITIONAL CRIMINALS
Consideration of these specialized guidelines draws attention to
a trend of discrepancy between how environmental defendants and other
federal defendants, committing more general crimes, are sentenced.0 4
for convicted organizations to mitigate their fines by maintaining strong compliance
programs").
9 In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959,969 (Del. Ch. 1996). Plaintiffs
alleged in a derivative action that members of a corporate board abrogated their fiduciary
duties of care to the corporation in connection with alleged violations of federal and state
laws and regulations applicable to health care providers.
" Diana E. Murphy, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations: A Decade of
Promoting Compliance and Ethics, 87 IowA L. REV. 697, 714 (2002).
100 MCGREGOR, supra note 87, at 125.
101 Id.
112 Id.; United States v. Mills, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18372 (N.D. Fla. 1989) (stating that
"[i]ntent to discharge fill material on protected wetlands is sufficient to support con-
viction; it is unnecessary to show defendant knew a permit was essential to legally do so"
(citing United States v. Bradshaw, 541 F. Supp. 880 (D. Md. 1981))).
103 Mills v. United States, 36 F.3d 1052, 1054 (11th Cir. 1994) (indicating that the sen-
tences were subsequently affirmed on direct appeal in an unpublished decision United
States v. Mills, 904 F.2d 713 (11th Cir. 1990)).
11
4 0'Hear, Sentencing the Green-Collar Offender, supra note 38, at 206 (pointing out that
the discrepancy is highlighted by seven years of data).
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An increasing disparity in the relative severity of punishments
illuminates the differences.lO "Mandatory minimum sentences, including
harsh recidivist laws" for repeat offenders, are used as punishment for
many traditional crimes unrelated to environmental violations.' 6 Fewer
environmental defendants are going to prison while the percentage of
federal defendants guilty of other crimes who are sentenced to jail time
continually increases. 10 7 "Sentencing Commission data make clear that
prison is the exception, not the norm, for environmental defendants,"
especially those representing corporations.'O
Environmental defendants, and most clearly corporations, appear
to be treated with lenience in comparison to individual criminals prose-
cuted within the federal system.0 9 This observed leniency can be attri-
buted in part to the substantial assistance and mitigating circumstance
departures that lessen environmental criminal sentences more often than
other defendants who commit non-environmental crimes."' Congress
determined that giving substantial assistance to the government, such as
owning up to wrongdoing or cooperating with mandates, should be seri-
ously considered when sentencing environmental crimes."' Substantial
assistance is a "public policy decision [that] addresses the broader soci-
etal concern of giving incentives for cooperating with law enforcement
authorities."" 2 Mitigating circumstances are situations or facts that do
not negate a defendant's guilt, but are considered by the court during the
sentencing process, especially when considering a less severe sentence.113
Another distinction can be made between the Sentencing Guideline's
treatment of corporations and its treatment of individuals. Corporations
cannot be incarcerated in the same manner as an individual, since they
have "no soul to be damned, and no body to be kicked."" 4 However, the
105 Id.
106 Brown, supra note 40, at 1314.
107 O'Hear, Sentencing the Green-Collar Offender, supra note 38, at 206.
108 Id. at 205.
'09 Id. at 207.110 Id. at 210.
"1 Habicht, supra note 14, at 10,482 (stating that "[elven if a criminal prosecution is un-
avoidable, substantial assistance rendered to the government may lead to immunity or
a favorable plea bargain for cooperative defendants in appropriate cases").
112 Federal Court Practices: Sentence Reduction Based on Defendants'SubstantialAssistance
to the Government, 11 FED. SENT'G REP. 18, 18 (1998).
113 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 260 (8th ed. 2004).
114 John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry
Into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REv. 386,386 (1981) (quoting M.
KING, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE CORPORATION 1 (1977)).
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law has developed in a direction that allows the actions of individuals
within a corporation, such as their executives or employees, to be con-
victed for criminal actions committed in the name of the corporation.
115
A. Sanctioning Corporate, White-Collar Criminals
"Since the Supreme Court's decision in New York Central & Hudson
River Railroad Co. v. United States,"6 organizations have been held vicari-
ously liable for the federal criminal offenses of its employees.... "117 In
a later Supreme Court case, United States v. Dotterweich, the Court held
the president of a pharmaceutical company liable for corporate violations
of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act based on the officer's level of respon-
sibility in the corporation. "' Liability was imputed to the corporation even
though it did not derive any pecuniary benefit from the individual's acts. 9
In 1940, Criminologist Edwin Sutherland coined the term "white-
collar crime," defining it as a crime committed by an otherwise respectable
person in the course of his or her business or occupation. 20 Economically
successful businessmen of otherwise upright standing commit most white-
collar offenses, including embezzlement, tax evasion, and violation of envi-
ronmental statutes.'2 ' As already addressed, however, the use of criminal
law is not the dominant approach to dealing with white-collar criminals,
whereas it is the most common tool used to deal with individuals who
commit crimes not within the scope of their employment.'22
B. Sanctioning Traditional (Non-Environmental) Criminals
Generally, many more individuals than corporations are prose-
cuted for criminal offenses. 123 Within the years 1996-2000, the courts
imposed 257,441 federal sentences on individuals while only imposing
115 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958).
116 212 U.S. 481 (1909) (finding that the traffic agent's use of his delegated authority to
make transportation rates and to pay illegal rebates upon shipments should be imputed
to the corporation for public policy reasons).
' Robert L. Kracht, Comment,A Critical Analysis of the Proposed Sentencing Guidelines
for Organizations Convicted of Environmental Crimes, 40 VILL. L. REV. 513,519 (1995).
118 United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
119 
Id.
o Edwin H. Sutherland, White-Collar Criminality, 5 AM. SOC. REV. 1, 1-4 (1940).
121 See Kitch, supra note 50, at 14.
122 Brown, supra note 40, at 1298.
123 See generally Murphy, supra note 99.
498 [Vol. 32:483
SENTENCING ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES
1,149 on corporations.124 This discrepancy may exist because corporate
crimes are often viewed as "unintentional or technical in nature, thereby
allowing white-collar offenders to be dealt with differently than street
criminals."'25
In the case of traditional individual crimes, the connection between
the individual and their communities is downplayed in comparison to cor-
porate agents and their firms. 126 Being part of a larger regulatory environ-
ment makes white-collar crime seem more a consequence of structural
influence rather than of morally blameworthy or deficient individuals.'27
The differences most likely have to do with the wealth of corporations and
their legal identity in contrast to the 'nonidentity' of individual offenders.
Whatever the reason, "the assignment of culpability [to corporations] is
muddied in a way that it is not in street crime." 28
Just as corporations commit environmental infractions in order
to save money and time, so do individuals. Individuals can also be found
guilty of environmental statute violations. John Rapanos was liable for
beginning construction of a subdivision over a wetland without seeking
the proper permit as required by the Clean Water Act.'29 Many crimes
committed by individuals unaffiliated with any organization or corporation
are recreational or household crimes committed for convenience. 30 These
include "dumping garbage and fuel from recreational boats; failing to
pack refuse out of wilderness areas... hunting or fishing for endangered
species out of season, or beyond legal limits; [and] ignoring fire bans."''
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME VICTIMS: PROBLEMS OF PROOF
The injuries caused by many environmental crimes may not be
immediately obvious and the threat they pose may "be gradual and silent,
going undetected for years."32 The victims of most environmental crimes
124 Id. at 699.
125 Brown, supra note 40, at 1315.
126 Id. at 1332.
12
1 See generally Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Crime, Justice, and the Savings
and Loan Crisis, in BEYOND THE LAW: CRIME IN COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS 247 (Michael
Tonry ed., 1993).
128 Brown, supra note 40, at 1319.
129 Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006).
130 SITu & EMMONS, supra note 2, at 114.
131 Id. at 115.
132Id. at 4.
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are not as easily identified as those in the Sixth Circuit case United
States v. Rutana.'33 In that case, the defendant was convicted of illegally
dumping highly acidic wastewater into a city sewer line. At the other end
of the pipe, the contaminated water badly burned two employees of the
sewage treatment plant.1
4
The indefinite predictions made by an expert in a case like United
States v. Thorn are more common when it comes to identifying environ-
mental threats or making criminal convictions. In the Thorn case, the
owner of an asbestos abatement service was convicted under the Clean
Air Act for violations of asbestos removal regulations. " At sentencing,
a government expert testified that there was a "virtual certainty" that at
least some of the defendant's seven hundred employees would eventually
become ill even though asbestos-related diseases may not appear until
twenty-five to thirty years after exposure.'36
Dangerous environmental pollution, such as toxic substances re-
leased impermissibly, often do no immediate, discernable damage and
may be absorbed into the tissues of the body, remaining there for years
before the effect of their presence, normally in the form of disease, mani-
fests itself.'3 ' The slow manifestation of environmentally-related injuries
indicates how difficult it can be to identify the victims of environmental
crimes. These crimes can often be too amorphous and difficult to evalu-
ate3 ' and therefore create a continuing challenge for the court system.
Prosecutors and investigators remain concerned "that fines and
administrative penalties are insufficient to deter bad conduct," that is
most often driven by greed.'39 Yet, incarceration may not be the answer
either because prison terms that incapacitate and deter environmental
criminals from recidivism levy a high price to society or do not adequately
13 United States v. Rutana, 18 F.3d 363 (6th Cir. 1994).
' Id. at 364.
135 United States v. Thorn, 317 F.3d 107 (2d. Cir. 2003).
136 Id. at 115-16.
' 
3 Tamsen Douglas Love, Deterring Irresponsible Use and Disposal of Toxic Substances:
The Case for Legislative Recognition of Increased Risk Causes ofAction, 49 VAND. L. REV.
789 (1996). "Although persons exposed to toxic substances may experience immediate
physical symptoms, more often exposure increases one's risk of contracting a serious
disease in the future. The disease may remain latent for many years after exposure."Id.
at 795-96.
"' Lucia Ann Silecchia & Michael J. Malinowski, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Does the
Sentencing of Corporate Citizens for Environmental Crimes Fit Within the Guidelines?,
8 FED. SENT'G REP. 230, 231 (1996).139 J. Michael Bradford, Environmental Crimes, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 5, 7 (2003).
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seek to address the root causes of environmental law violations. 4 ° The
inadequacy of current methods indicates the need for additional sen-
tencing strategies that can be coupled with the civil, administrative, and
criminal penalties already in existence.
Many reasons to favor alternative sentences for environmental
crimes that do not include prison or fines exist. Some of these reasons
include less expense to taxpayers, keeping the employee as a productive
member of society and the workforce, and working toward education and
deterrence goals.' 4' The therapeuticjurisprudence and restorative justice
models, if added into the arsenal of sentencing possibilities for environ-
mental defendants, could permit swifter resolutions for smaller crimes,
improve self-reporting and monitoring problems, and assure more positive
outcomes by ensuring that offenders are held accountable and that the
public can play a role that they are otherwise not afforded. The goals of both
models include some of the same goals as criminal and civil approaches,
including deterring offenders from future lawbreaking and supporting
offender rehabilitation.'42
V. EXPANDING THE SENTENCING ARSENAL
A. Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Problem-Solving Courts
1. History and Development (Defendant-Focused)
"Therapeutic jurisprudence began in the late 1980s as an inter-
disciplinary scholarly approach in the area of mental health law."'43 Since
the 1990s, the use of therapeutic jurisprudence has also been applied to
analyze issues in healthcare, disability law, and contract law, among
others.'" At its core, therapeutic jurisprudence is a broad and potentially
all-encompassing concept that "examines whether the law and legal insti-
tutions have healing effects or detrimental effects" 4 ' and attempts to
140Id.
141 Johnson, supra note 89.
142 David Dolinko, Restorative Justice and the Justification of Punishment, 2003 UTAH L.
REV. 319, 319 (2003).
" Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Problem Solving Courts, 30 FoRDHAM
URB. L.J. 1055, 1062 (2003).
144 DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE I. WINICK, LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE xvi (1996).
141 Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Appeal of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 24 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 223,223 (2000).
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ascertain whether the negative effects can be reduced "without subordi-
nating due process and other justice values."'46
Potentially, some scholars argue that "[a] spillover into criminal
law and procedure" might be appropriate for therapeutic jurisprudence
concepts. 14 Following that line of argument, this method could work in
the context of environmental crime as "a tool for gaining a new and dis-
tinct perspective on questions regarding the law and its applications." 48
The problem-solving court model may be the most workable example of
how therapeutic principles can help to combat environmental crime. This
model is a sentencing possibility that could serve as a different way to
focus on non-compliant corporations and individuals.
The first drug problem-solving court was established in 1989
followed by domestic violence courts in 1996 and mental health courts
in 1997.169 This recently developed court model takes a therapeutic ap-
proach to using the legal process and the role of the judge to rehabilitate
offenders. 50 Supporters of problem-solving courts would agree with the
proposition that while retributive policies might feel productive,' "they
do not necessarily reduce crime" or reduce the harm felt by victims.'52
These newer courts attempt a "radical judicial reorientation"'53 and deal
with problems such as drug abuse and domestic violence that continue
to require "focused and sustained attention. "1 4 However, despite the
4 EllenA. Waldman, The Evaluative-Facilitative Debate in Mediation:Applying the Lens
of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 155, 157 (1998).
' David B. Wexler, An Orientation to Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 20 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM.
& CIV. CONFINEMENT 259, 263 (1994) [hereinafter Wexler, Orientation].
148 Peggy Fulton Hora et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment Court
Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice System's Response to Drug Abuse and
Crime in America, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439,445 (1999).
149 James L. Nolan, Jr., Redefining Criminal Courts: Problem-Solving and the Meaning
of Justice, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1541, 1542-44 (2003).
150 Winick, supra note 143, at 1066.
151 Brian D. Skaret, A Victim's Right to View: A Distortion of the Retributivist Theory of
Punishment, 28 J. LEGIS. 349,352-53 (2002) ("When a member of the community acts in
selfish disregard of the common good, retributive theory dictates that society must punish
the offender.").
152 Logan, supra note 94, at 383.
153 Greg Berman, Redefining Criminal Courts: Problem-Solving Courts and the Meaning
of Justice, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1313 (2004).
154 Victor E. Flango, DWI Courts: The Newest Problem-Solving Courts, NATL CTR. FOR
STATE COURTS, 1 (2004), available at http://www.yourhonor.com/dwi/dwicourts/NCSC
Article.pdf.
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changes, problem-solving courts remain connected to the traditional court
system.'55
In a problem-solving court, one judge may deal with all cases'56 and
allows "the court process to actually become part of the [offender's] treat-
ment.""'7 The purposes of these courts include "(1) immediate intervention,
(2) nonadversarial adjudication, [and] (3) hands-on judicial involvement.' 158
The judges attempt to actively resolve the case before them and the prob-
lems that caused the parties to come to the courtroom. These judges re-
ceive specific training and play a part in helping to monitor and supervise
the treatment processes of offenders.'59
Within these specialized courts, "evolving standards, continuous
monitoring and collaboration replace existing structures."6 ° The model has
been well received, and the use of the courts has expanded because they
have allowed for "more effective case load management, reduced systemic
costs..., and decreased rates of recidivism" within the specialized areas
of law to which the model is applied.' Achieving those three goals would
be significantly beneficial in the fight against environmental crime, another
specialized area in the law.
2. Application to Environmental Crimes
Given that the problem-solving courts and the concept of thera-
peutic jurisprudence "represent a newly broadened conception of the role
of the courts," '162 it may be feasible to apply these approaches to the specific
realm of environmental crime. Employing only one judge would greatly
reduce the necessary resources to prosecute environmental crimes, espe-
cially if the judge traveled to partake in the traditional trials for environ-
mental violations, such as those with identifiable local effects and those
155 Hora et al., supra note 148, at 471.
1
56 Id.
157 Id. at 472 (quoting JOHN S. GOLDKAMP, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE AND TREATMENT
INNOVATIONS: THE DRUG COURT MOVEMENT - A WORKING PAPER OF THE NATIONAL DRUG
COURT CONFERENCE, DECEMBER 1993, at 11 (1994)).
156 Flango, supra note 154.
1 Winick, supra note 143, at 1065.
160 Timothy Casey, When Good Intentions Are Not Enough: Problem-Solving Courts and
the Impending Crisis of Legitimacy, 57 SMU L. REV. 1459, 1459 (2004).
161 Hora et al., supra note 148, at 456. See also Linda Drazga Maxfield, Measuring
Recidivism Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 17 FED. SENT'G. REP. 166, 166
(2004) (relating the rate of recidivism to the likelihood that an offender will re-offend).
162 Winick, supra note 143, at 1090.
2008] 503
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLy REV.
committed by individuals. This particular judge could have the respon-
sibility of acquiring detailed expertise in the field of environmental law and
with the parameters of environmental sentencing. 163 An environmental
problem-solving court judge who has particularized knowledge concern-
ing the lengthy environmental statutes and their penalties could create
unique sentencing requirements for each individual defendant.
When considering a corporation rather than an individual, ajudge
could consider different options. Courts could compel a company to hire
someone to come by periodically, potentially unannounced, to monitor or
audit the companies' behavior. 164 Alternatively, they could insist that the
violator of the law or the company's Board of Directors hold meetings to
teach the corporation about what should be considered to comply with the
laws, taking necessary steps to ensure compliance.'65 Indeed, an employee
within a company would be more likely "to know where problems of ille-
gality have occurred previously, and to be able to detect cover-ups" in a
way that an external auditor might not.'66 In addition, a problem-solving
judge could impose requirements that benefit the community by requiring
a company that has committed an environmental offense to individually
provide, or pay for an environmental specialist to provide, free seminars.'67
3. Potential Problems with This Argument
The practical application of these strategies may be difficult and
there are certain weaknesses that must be acknowledged and addressed.
An initial argument might be that there are regulatory agencies already
16 David B. Rottman, Does Effective Therapeutic Jurisprudence Require Specialized
Courts (and Do Specialized Courts Imply Specialist Judges)?, 37 COURT REv. 22,23(2000)
(stating that"[sipecialized courts... are staffed by permanentjudges who have substantive
expertise in the area" (quoting ISAAC UNAH, THE COURTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE:
JUDICIAL SPECIALIZATION, EXPERTISE, AND BUREAUCRATIC POLICY-MAKING 7 (1998))).
164 Mia Anna Mazza, The New Evidentiary Privilege for Environmental Audit Reports:
Making the Worst of a Bad Situation, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 79, 86 (1996).
165 Johnson, supra note 89, at 281 (stating that violators of an environmental statute "can
use their new knowledge to help teach others about their mistakes, and the regulated
community can use this information to [sic] towards self-compliance").
166 Brent Fisse & John Braithwaite, The Allocation of Responsibility for Corporate Crime:
Individualism, Collectivism, and Accountability, 11 SYDNEY L. REV. 468, 496 (1988).
167 Johnson, supra note 89, at 281-82 (advocating that free seminars or public speeches
provide the opportunity for others to learn how to prevent violations of environmental
statutes).
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playing these roles for individuals and corporations. However, the counter-
argument is that by the time the court steps in, regulation by that agency
has failed to work. A second argument may concern the fact that envi-
ronmental crime lacks the clear therapeutic potential that exists when
dealing with mental health issues, drug abusers, or situations of domestic
violence.168 However, the purpose of using a therapeutic approach would
simply be to apply the problem-solving model.'69 The usefulness of the
problem-solving approach may extend beyond simply considering the
therapeutic potential of those courts.
Another argument might be that decisions by corporate managers
or individuals to accept jail time or fines rather than comply with statu-
tory mandates may undermine how well the problem-solving model will
work.' v To address this possibility, there should be incentives during a
trial to lessen jail time or monetary fines if a corporation or individual
agrees to take part in the more therapeutic process. This could be deemed
akin to giving substantial assistance to the government. 171
A final argument against problem-solving courts is that such a
therapeutic approach is not punitive in nature and therefore does not add
enough to the traditional system to be worth the effort.7 2 However, the
proactive solutions discussed above regarding education and monitoring
assistance for other companies are applied relatively easily and help pre-
vent future violations, reducing the overall number of traditional trials.
The problem-solving model makes executives 'useful' at their own expense
instead of simply levying them a fine or mandating time in prison. Spe-
cialized environmental problem-solving courts may permit swifter reso-
lutions for smaller crimes, reduce docket backlog, improve self-reporting
and monitoring problems, and assure more positive outcomes by making
offenders accountable and further protecting the public.173 For these
168 See generally David B. Wexler, Reflections on the Scope of Therapeutic Jurisprudence,
1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 220 (1995) [hereinafter Wexler, Reflections].169 Winick, supra note 143, at 1062 (stating that problem-solving courts are situated "within
the scholarly and law reform approach known as therapeutic jurisprudence").
170 Wexler, Reflections, supra note 168, at 220.
... See O'Hear, Sentencing The Green-Collar Offender, supra note 38, at 211 (noting that
"substantial assistance" is one of the most frequent reasons for sentence departures in
environmental cases).
172 Nolan, supra note 149, at 1564 (identifying the difficulties of "objecting to therapeu-
tically justified sanctions because they are classified as 'treatment,' not punishment").
17 3 See generally Eric Lane, Due Process and Problem-Solving Courts, 30 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 955 (2003).
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reasons, its use in the context of environmental crime may prove to be
an effective means of enforcement.
B. Restorative Justice
1. History and Development (Victim-Focused)
In contrast to therapeutic problem-solving courts, restorative justice
focuses on the victim, allowing them a more active role in sentencing. In
the early 1970s, the Mennonite Central Committee workers established
the first "victim-offender reconciliation program" that utilized the concept
of restorative justice.'74 Since that time, much of the restorative justice
literature focuses on relatively minor juvenile crime, but some proponents
of the model believe it can apply to adult crime, civil disputes, and large-
scale political conflicts as well.'75
Advocates of restorative justice "view crime as more than simply
lawbreaking, an offense against government authority; crime is under-
stood also to cause multiple injuries to victims, the community, and even
the offender."'76 The theory gives a community "a voice in the criminal pro-
cess" 77 and calls for a restructuring of the criminal system. 17 Restorative
justice can provide restitution to the victim, put "a human face on the offen-
der," and give "the victim some appreciation of how the circumstances may
have brought the offender to commit the offense." 79 Ideally, restorative
174 Lenna Kurki, Restorative and Community Justice in the United States, 27 CRIME &
JUST. 235, 265 (2000).
175 Stephen P. Garvey, Restorative Justice, Punishment, and Atonement, 2003 UTAH L.
REV. 303 (2003) (basing this contention on the opinion that restorative justice cannot
eliminate punishment and that "restoration does require punishment"); see also JOHN
BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & RESPONSIVE REGULATION 16 (2002).
17 Daniel W. Van Ness, New Wine and Old Wineskins: Four Challenges of Restorative
Justice, 4 CRIM. L.F. 251, 259 (1993).177 Eric W. Nicastro, Confronting the Neighbors: Community Impact Panels in the Realm
of Restorative Justice and Punishment Theory, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 261, 261
(2003). See also Robert Weisberg, Restorative Justice and the Danger of "Community,"
2003 UTAH L. REV. 343,343 (2003) (stating that "[i]n the language of restorative justice,
'community' is the bedrock on which justice stands or the latent source of moral energy
on which justice draws").
171 Michael M. O'Hear, Is Restorative Justice Compatible with Sentencing Uniformity?,
89 MARQ. L. REV. 305, 306 (2005) [hereinafter O'Hear, Restorative Justice].
171 Paul H. Robinson, The Virtues ofRestorative Processes, The Vices of"Restorative Justice",
2003 UTAH L. REV. 375, 376 (2003).
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justice processes will be able "to change an offender's perspective ...
[and] make them fully appreciate the human side of the harm they have
done.""' ° The goal behind restorative justice is that the restorative pro-
cess can change an offender's behavior if the opportunity to take criminal
action arises in the future.
Sentencing circles are a specific application of the restorative
justice model. In existence since 1991, sentencing circles are open to all
members of a community who choose to participate in them.18' The com-
munity determines a sentence that possibly includes jail time, though in
practice most sentences are community based and include house arrest or
community service.8 2 In this way, sentencing circles focus on restoring
and empowering the victim or victims.
Community impact panels are similar to sentencing circles. These
panels promote the values of restorative justice by empowering a com-
munity to stand up against businesses and companies that may seem too
large to confront."s A "panel consists of one or more offenders, community
members, a trained facilitator [who gives a one-hour training and orien-
tation to those who volunteer], and an out-of-uniform police officer.""8 4
Offenders must attend following "a judge's initial determination or a
court approved plea-bargain."185
2. Application to Environmental Crime
Restorative justice creates a forum in which an "offender meets
face-to-face" with representatives of a harmed community.8 6 This face-
to-face "meeting involves a facilitated dialogue in which all participants
are given an opportunity to share their views."8 7 In essence, this approach
requires less "professional expertise in substantive law, procedure, or
sanctioning. "188 Restorative justice seeks to simplify procedure and put
1
80 Id. at 375.
181 Kurki, supra note 174, at 280-81.
182 Id. at 282.
183 Nicastro, supra note 177, at 265.
184 Id. at 267.
185 Id.
18 O'Hear, Restorative Justice, supra note 178, at 307.
187Id.
188 Susan M. Olson & Albert W. Dzur, Reconstructing Professional Roles in Restorative
Justice Programs, 2003 UTAH L. REv. 57, 63 (2003).
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the offender and the affected party in direct control over the outcome. 8 9
The restorative process is a unique approach to justice that can be applied
to unique crimes. Therefore, restorative justice principles can work well
when handling specialized types of crime, including corporate and indi-
vidual crimes affecting the environment.
Environmental crime, just like prostitution and vandalism, can
cause the victimization of a community as a whole. 90 The restorative jus-
tice model envisions crime as "a violation of people and relationships" that
"creates obligations to make things right."'9 ' Environmental violations
threaten human and environmental health, and that threat can be con-
sidered a harm which restorative justice may ameliorate. Unfortunately,
the effects of environmental crimes may not be purely local or readily rec-
ognizable. Therefore, the restorative justice paradigm will be most useful
when applied to crimes that result in identifiable harms within a specific
community or that are committed by a specific individual.
In such situations, when a corporate employee causes identifiable
harm, the individual at fault, along with the corporate executives, should
be present to explain the reason for their illegal conduct. 192 The members
of the public who represent the community would then express the im-
pact resulting from the corporation's actions or inactions. In addition to
expressing these views, the participants will seek consensus as to restor-
ative measures to minimize the harm.'93 The restorative justice dialogue
occurs in place of judicial sentencing and if no agreement is reached or
the offender chooses not to participate, sentencing will take place in the
conventional manner.
194
189 Id. (stating that "the outcome-and, to a lesser degree, the process-can be tailored to
the individual circumstances rather than relying on standard procedure").
190 Nicastro, supra note 177, at 261; see also Darren Bush, Law and Economics of
Restorative Justice: Why Restorative Justice Cannot and Should Not Be Solely About
Restoration, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 439,461 n. 117 (2003) (stating that "[riestorative justice
views a crime as having an immediate victim and secondary victims, such as the
community").19 1 
HOWARD ZEHR, CHANGING LENSES: A NEW Focus FOR CRIME AND JUSTICE 181 (1990).
192 As of yet, restorative justice principles have not been applied to a corporation, but the
idea is considered. See Peter Cleary Yeager, Law Versus Justice: From Adversarialism
to Communitarianism, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 891,899 (2004) (stating that "polic[ies] that
appl[y] the principles of restorative justice to both street crime and business crime will...
not only reduce offending but also increase justice").
193 O'Hear, Restorative Justice, supra note 178, at 307.
194 Id.
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3. Possible Problems with This Argument
The sentencing circle and community impact strategies could work
in the context of environmental crime. However, this type of privately-
negotiated dispute resolution can be criticized as being fraught with bar-
gaining inequality,' 9 and in terms of sentencing corporations for envi-
ronmental crime, that criticism does have some merit. Corporations are
undeniably more powerful than community individuals simply because
they can exert more leverage via political clout, monetary muscle, and
sheer size.
Skeptics also worry that restorative justice does not promote uni-
formity in sentencing, 9 ' since different communities may see different
punishments as appropriate for companies or individuals committing the
same types of offenses, 197 such as illegal dumping or filling in wetlands
without a permit. In contrast, formal sentencing guidelines within the
traditional criminal justice system focus on sentencing uniformity, due pro-
cess protection, and ensuring the existence of procedural safeguards.' 9
Critics contend that these concerns are not fully addressed within the
practice of restorative justice.' 99
In response, supporters of the restorative justice model ask whether
due process is infringed upon any differently than it is in a plea bargain."'
Plea bargaining circumvents "rigorous standards of due process and proof
imposed during trials"0 ' and occurs in eighty percent of felony prosecu-
tions.2" 2 Given that a plea bargain involves the acceptability of a sentence
to the defendant, the application of restorative justice sentencing could
'95 Id. at 322.
... See Dolinko, supra note 142, at 331-34 (noting that restorative justice may give similar
offenders disparate treatment).
197 See O'Hear, Restorative Justice, supra note 178, at 306.
18 Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Use of Mediation to Resolve Criminal Cases: A Procedural
Critique, 43 EMORY L.J. 1247, 1281 (1994).
.. See John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and PessimisticAccounts,
25 CRIME & JUST. 1, 104 (1999) ("[R]ights can be trampled because of the inferior articu-
lation of procedural safeguards in restorative justice processes compared to [the] courts.").
2 8 Mary Ellen Reimund, The Law and Restorative Justice: Friend or Foe? A Systemic Look
at the Legal Issues in Restorative Justice, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 667, 684 (2005).
281Alissa Pollitz Worden, Policymaking by Prosecutors: The Uses ofDiscretion in Regulating
Plea Bargaining, 73 JUDICATURE 335,336 (1990).
202 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Criminal Case Processing
Statistics, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/cases.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2008) (noting that
"ninety-five percent of convictions occurring within 1 year of arrest were obtained through
a guilty plea").
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require that, if desired, an individual could reject a sentence in favor of
a traditional trial. °3
Furthermore, it is arguable that in the context of environmental
crime, talk is not enough; without some material burden, a corporation will
be sent the wrong message. If the volunteer community members are
sympathetic to the intentions of the corporation or the individual who has
committed the environmental crime, this warning may be justified. For
example, in the case of John Rapanos, volunteers may find a new apart-
ment complex to be more useful than a wetland, offering a lenient punish-
ment.2' This could send a message of complicity which would not deter
people like John Rapanos from circumventing environmental regulations in
the future. Another instance in which this could happen is if a corporation
negligently dumps their waste in violation of the Clean Water Act, while
simultaneously providing services that the community appreciates. In this
case, the community impact panel volunteers may overlook the damage to
the waterways because they feel that it does not directly affect them.
"Restorativejustice advocates dream of a day when justice is fully
restorative, but whether this is realistic is debatable, at least in the im-
mediate future."2 °5 Perhaps, approaching restorative justice as a comple-
ment to the criminal justice system rather than a replacement is the
best starting point in adding to the arsenal of possible types of environ-
mental crimes sentences. °6
C. The Question of Double Jeopardy
If the restorative and therapeutic models are applied to environ-
mental crimes, traditional criminal and civil sanctions are still required
to deal with some cases and situations. 2 7 The argument that this imposes
two types of punishment on corporate or individual offenders can be easily
dismissed.
203 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1190 (8th ed. 2004) (defining plea bargain as "[a] negotiated
agreement between a prosecutor and a criminal defendant whereby the defendant pleads
guilty to a lesser offense or to one of multiple charges in exchange for some concession by
the prosecutor, usu [ally] a more lenient sentence or a dismissal of the other charges").
24 See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
205 HowARD ZEHR, THE LITTLE BOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 59 (GOOD BOOKS 2002).
206 See Reimund, supra note 200, at 672 ("There are ... numerous programs operating
as complements to the criminal justice system.").
207 ZEHR, supra note 205, at 60.
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In Hudson v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that the
double jeopardy clause, outlined in the Fifth Amendment of the Consti-
tution, only protects against multiple criminal punishments for the same
offense."' The Court also held that an administrative proceeding is not
a bar to later criminal prosecution since administrative proceedings are
civil, not criminal." 9 Restorative justice and therapeutic jurisprudence
approaches carried out through sentencing circles, community impact
panels, or problem-solving courts are not criminal and work toward more
remedial outcomes than criminal punishment.21 °
As proposed in the Appellee's Brief in DirectTV, Inc. v. Treworgy,
as long as the goal of the sanction (a civil sanction in that particular
case) is remedial, it does not matter if it has some punitive or deterrent
effects.21' Restorative justice and therapeutic jurisprudence can be
considered as "other social policy options" and constitute "nonlegal crime
prevention strategies. "22 Thus, even if an environmental offender were
'tried' through a restorative or therapeutic approach and later criminal
prosecution was initiated, the double jeopardy clause would not bar the
use of a criminal trial.1 3
CONCLUSION
Since the 1970s, the government and the public have paid in-
creasing attention to the seriousness of environmental crime. The EPA,
the DOJ and the United States Sentencing Commission have utilized
208 Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (". . . nor
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb .... ").
29 Hudson, 522 U.S. at 104.
21o See Jason M. Day, The Intertwining ofAdministrative Action and the Criminal Justice
System, 4TEX. TECH. J. TEX. ADMIN. L. 99,104(2003) (explaining that ifa sanction promotes
a remedial purpose, as restorative justice and therapeutic approaches do, the double
jeopardy clause will not be triggered).
211 See Appellee's Brief at 6, DirectTV, Inc. v. Treworgy, 373 F.3d 1124 (11th Cir. 2004)
(No. 03-15313-BB) (stating that "[tihe mere fact that civil derivative actions under the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 ("EPCA") provide a significant deterrent
effect does not alter the fact that Congress' primary purpose for the provision was remedial
and compensatory").
212 Brown, supra note 40, at 1297.
213 Id. at 1352 (stating that drug courts foster and rely "on trust, cooperation, and per-
suasion, but [are] backed up by monitoring and the threat of punitive sanctions, which are
used only when less punitive options [therapeutic or restorative approaches, for example]
have temporarily failed" (citation omitted)).
51120081
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
administrative, civil, and criminal sanctions to deal with these crimes
committed within the scope of corporate duties and also by unaffiliated
individuals. However, the number of environmental crime cases being
heard by courts continues to increase.214 This may be because monitoring
has become stricter and more environmental crimes are being discovered,
or because statutory sanctions are not properly handling the root causes
of why corporations and individuals violate environmental laws.
If the latter is true, it may be that new approaches, such as the
therapeutic jurisprudence and restorative justice theories, are worth a
closer look. Both these models involve a different consideration of "tradi-
tional notions... [ofi deterrence, rehabilitation, incapacitation, and crime
prevention."215 In fact, "[ilt is by no means clear that we can persuade
the public to view conduct as wrongful by making it criminal[;]" therefore
utilizing restorative and problem-solving approaches may be even more
useful.216 These models depend on more attention from specifically trained
judges and increased input from the public. Both of these recently devel-
oped specialized approaches may be what is needed to bolster sentencing
possibilities for specialized crimes such as those identified within the
environmental statutes.
214 Olson & Dzur, supra note 188, at 58 ("[Clriticism that has contributed to restorative
justice notes the failure of the conventional process to significantly reduce crime in general
and recidivism in particular.").
215 Braithwaite, supra note 199, at 2. See also Brown, supra note 40, at 1297 (acknowledging
that "[c]riminal law's expressive and retributive functions sometimes conflict because
punitive approaches alienate offenders, reduce cooperation toward compliance, and may
damage the legitimacy of law that is important for deterrence" and that "retributivist
sanctions can harm prevention efforts and reduce voluntary compliance," all of which are
important for dealing with environmental crimes).
216 Herbert L. Packer, The Businessman as Criminal, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction,
in CORPORATE AND WHITE COLLAR CRIME: AN ANTHOLOGY 12 (Leonard Orland ed., 1995).
Packer states that "there is very little evidence to suggest that the stigma of criminality
means anything very substantial in the life of a corporation." Id. at 12.
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